Stable investment or stable climate? Would New Zealand be in breach of its investment treat obligations if it phased out fossil fuel extraction? by Boardman, Claire Charlotte (Lottie)
  
CLAIRE CHARLOTTE BOARDMAN (LOTTIE) 
 
STABLE INVESTMENT OR STABLE CLIMATE? WOULD 
NEW ZEALAND BE IN BREACH OF ITS INVESTMENT 
TREATY OBLIGATIONS IF IT PHASED OUT FOSSIL 
FUEL EXTRACTION?  
 
 
 
LLM RESEARCH PAPER 
LAWS 582: MASTERS LEGAL WRITING 
 
FACULTY OF LAW 
 
2016 
 
2 Claire Boardman – Stable investment or stable climate?  
 
Contents  
I INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 5 
II CLIMATE CHANGE, FOSSIL FUELS AND NEW ZEALAND ................ 7 
A Fossil fuels and climate change ........................................................................ 7 
B What is a "dangerous level" of climate change? ........................................... 8 
C How much fossil fuel must be kept in the ground to stabilise the climate 
below 1.5 or 2ºC? ....................................................................................................... 9 
D New Zealand’s relationship with fossil fuels ................................................ 10 
E New Zealand’s green-house gas emissions ................................................... 13 
F New Zealand and fossil fuel subsidies ........................................................... 14 
G Would New Zealand deciding to halt fossil fuel extraction make any 
difference to global carbon emissions? .................................................................. 14 
III REGULATION OF FOSSIL FUEL EXTRACTION IN NEW 
ZEALAND ....................................................................................................... 15 
A Rights to extract New Zealand’s fossil fuels ................................................. 15 
1 Ownership of New Zealand’s fossil fuels ........................................ 15 
2 The purpose behind the fossil fuel permit scheme......................... 16 
3 Types of permits................................................................................ 17 
4 Permit conditions .............................................................................. 19 
5 Allocation of permits ........................................................................ 20 
6 Royalties payable .............................................................................. 20 
7 Changes to permit conditions .......................................................... 21 
8 Revocation or transfer of permits to the Crown ............................ 21 
B Essential ancillary permissions ...................................................................... 22 
1 Land access arrangements ............................................................... 22 
2 Resource consents ............................................................................. 22 
3 Other obligations .............................................................................. 23 
C Regulation of coal ........................................................................................... 23 
D Summary ......................................................................................................... 23 
IV LEGAL OPTIONS FOR HALTING FOSSIL FUEL EXTRACTION 
IN NEW ZEALAND ....................................................................................... 24 
A Constraints on executive action ..................................................................... 24 
B Consequences of legislative action ................................................................. 26 
1 Would there be any remedy for investors under New Zealand 
domestic law? .................................................................................................. 27 
V NEW ZEALAND’S INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
OBLIGATIONS .............................................................................................. 28 
A New Zealand’s investment treaties ................................................................ 28 
1 New Zealand-Australia investment protection regime ................. 29 
B What is an “investment”? .............................................................................. 30 
C Key investment protections ............................................................................ 30 
1 Compensation for expropriation ..................................................... 30 
3 Claire Boardman – Stable investment or stable climate?  
 
2 National treatment ............................................................................ 31 
3 Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment .................................................. 31 
4 Fair and equitable treatment ........................................................... 32 
D Remedies for foreign investors ...................................................................... 32 
E Summary ......................................................................................................... 33 
VI WOULD NEW ZEALAND HAVE TO COMPENSATE FOREIGN 
INVESTORS FOR PHASING OUT FOSSIL FUEL EXTRACTION? .... 33 
A Would the removed rights be “investments”? ............................................. 34 
B Would those rights have been expropriated? ............................................... 34 
C Would there have been a breach of the minimum standard of 
customary international law? ................................................................................ 35 
D Do New Zealand’s obligations under the UNFCCC and the Paris 
Agreement lend weight to the argument that there is a legitimate public 
purpose for phasing out of fossil fuel extraction? ................................................ 36 
1 No mention of fossil fuels in the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol 
and Paris Agreement ...................................................................................... 36 
2 Are fossil fuel reserves “sinks” or “reservoirs” for the 
purposes of the UNFCCC? ............................................................................ 37 
3 What do the duties in articles 4(1)(d) and 4(2)(a) require New 
Zealand to do in relation to fossil fuel reserves? .......................................... 39 
VII CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 41 
 
4 Claire Boardman – Stable investment or stable climate?  
 
Abstract 
This paper considers the possibility of phasing out fossil fuel extraction in New Zealand.  
It examines New Zealand’s current relationship with fossil fuels and its legal framework 
relating to fossil fuel extraction before assessing the remedies available to domestic and 
foreign investors should fossil fuel extraction be phased out, thereby removing their current 
rights to extract fossil fuels.  The paper concludes that there would no remedy available to 
domestic investors but there is a possibility that foreign investors could claim 
compensation pursuant to an investment treaty such as Chapter 9 of Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement.  It was also argued that New Zealand would have arguments to 
make that it should not have to compensate those investors, including an argument based 
on a duty under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change for New 
Zealand to protect its fossil fuel reserves.   
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 12,630 words. 
 
 
Subjects and Topics 
International Law – Climate Change 
International Law – Investment Treaties 
Administrative Law – Judicial Review 
Environmental Law – Crown Minerals Act 1991 
  
5 Claire Boardman – Stable investment or stable climate?  
 
I Introduction 
 
At the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”)1 in Paris in December 2015, states adopted the Paris Agreement, committing 
to a long-term goal of keeping the rise in average global temperature to well below 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels2 and setting up the framework for international action on 
climate change from 2020. Leading up to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, citizens 
came out in force around the world, calling on states to take strong action on climate 
change.3 Following the signing of the Paris Agreement in April 2016, climate activists have 
initiated a global wave of protest action encouraging states and companies to break free 
from the use of and dependence on fossil fuels, which they argue will be necessary to 
achieve the Paris Agreement’s stated goal.4  In Germany, protest took the form of 
occupying a coal mine and shutting down supply a nearby coal-fired power plant.5  In 
Washington State, protestors stopped oil trains from proceeding to refineries.6 In Australia, 
flotillas of kayaks blockaded the port of Newcastle to stop coal ships entering and leaving 
the harbour and other protestors occupied a rail bridge to prevent coal trains from passing.7  
In New Zealand, activists blockaded various ANZ branches after requests to divest from 
fossil fuel investments went unheeded.8  Earlier in the year, climate change activists 
blockaded the New Zealand Petroleum Conference. 9 
 
  
1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1771 UNTS 107 (opened for signature 9 May 
1992, entered into force 21 March 1994). 
2 Paris Agreement (opened for signature 22 April 2016, not yet in force), art 2. 
3 See for instance Olivia Hannan “New Zealanders rally to global People's Climate March call for action” 
Stuff.co.nz (online ed, 28 November 2015). 
4 Oliver Milman “'Break Free' fossil fuel protests deemed 'largest ever' global disobedience” The Guardian 
(online ed, 16 May 2016). 
5 Karin Jäger “Worldwide actions to 'break free' from fossil fuels” Deutsche Welle (online ed, 13 May 2016). 
Anon “Blockade in Brandenburg: Aktivisten legen Kohlekraftwerk lahm” Spiegel (online ed, 14 May 2016). 
6 Oliver Milman “'Break Free' fossil fuel protests deemed 'largest ever' global disobedience” The Guardian 
(online ed, 16 May 2016). 
7 Bill Code and David Marchese “Protesters descend on Newcastle as flotilla attempts to stop coal exports” 
ABC News (online ed, 9 May 2016). 
8 Matt Stewart “Activists blockade Wellington ANZ branch, demand fossil fuel divestment” Stuff.co.nz 
(online ed, 11 May 2016); Joe Higham “130 Dunedin activists protest ANZ’s $13.5 billion investments in 
fossil fuel” The Critic (online ed, 15 May 2016). 
9 Anon “Greenpeace activists blockade petroleum conference in Auckland” Stuff.co.nz (online ed, 21 March 
2016). 
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Over a similar timeframe, activists (climate and otherwise) have been protesting about 
another international agreement, but this time showing vociferous opposition.  The text of 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (“TPPA”)10 was officially released in November 
201511 and it was signed in Auckland on 4 February 2016.12  In New Zealand’s largest 
protest of 2016, Queen Street was closed, protestors blockaded SkyCity where the 
agreement was being signed and blocked various motorway on and off ramps.13  The TPPA 
is a "free-trade" agreement between New Zealand, Australia, the United States of America, 
Canada, Mexico, Japan, Chile, Peru, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore and Brunei 
Darussalam.14  The signatories to the TPPA account for 36% of global GDP.15  The purpose 
of its establishment is to promote trade and investment liberalisation and economic growth 
amongst its parties.16  One of the most controversial parts of the TPPA’s thousands of pages 
is Chapter 9, which provides protection for investors from TPPA countries who invest in 
other TPPA countries, including protection from direct or indirect expropriation of foreign 
investments.17  The provision for investors to sue states over a perceived breach in those 
protections is particularly concerning to activists who argue that the threat of investor-state 
arbitration will have a chilling effect on governments making regulation in the public 
interest.18   
 
This paper will examine the possibility of phasing out fossil fuel extraction in New Zealand 
in the context of New Zealand’s existing laws and its international commitments (or likely 
commitments) under the UNFCCC and Chapter 9 of the TPPA.  In particular, this paper 
will examine whether New Zealand would be in breach of its obligations to foreign 
investors under the TPPA if it phased out fossil fuel extraction in its territory and Exclusive 
Economic Zone (“EEZ”); the consequence of that breach being that New Zealand would 
have to compensate any foreign investors who instigated arbitral proceedings for the loss 
caused by the breach. Part II of this paper will set out the factual context to this issue 
  
10 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (signed 4 February 2016, not yet in force). 
11 Tim Groser “New Zealand releases TPP text” (press release, 5 November 2015). 
12 Audrey Young “TPP is signed but hurdles remain” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 5 February 2016). 
13 Amelia Wade “Protesters: We came, we disrupted, we were heard” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 5 
February 2016). 
14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade “Trans-Pacific Partnership” < www.tpp.mfat.govt.nz>. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Trans-Pacific Partnership, above n 10, at the Preamble. 
17 Chris Bramwell “Will the TPP undermine NZ's sovereignty?” (3 February 2016) Radio New Zealand 
<http://www.radionz.co.nz> 
18 Simon Terry The Environment under TPPA Governance (Expert Paper #4, Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement New Zealand Expert Paper Series, January 2016) at 11 – 14. 
7 Claire Boardman – Stable investment or stable climate?  
 
including a definition of fossil fuels and descriptions of New Zealand’s relationship with 
fossil fuels and of the relationship between fossil fuels and climate change.  Part III will 
examine New Zealand’s existing laws relating to fossil fuel extraction, and in particular 
whether it would be possible within the current framework to stop all fossil fuel extraction. 
Part IV will examine various legal methods for phasing out fossil fuel extraction in New 
Zealand and the remedies available to fossil fuel investors within New Zealand’s domestic 
legal system depending on the method utilised. Part V will set out the protections provided 
to foreign investors under Chapter 9 of the TPPA (should it enter into force) and New 
Zealand’s other investment treaties.  Part VI will examine whether phasing out fossil fuel 
extraction would be likely to breach the protections described in Part V, taking into account 
any defences that would be available to New Zealand should a foreign investor make a 
claim against it.  In particular, Part VI will discuss whether New Zealand’s obligations 
under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement provide a defence or justification for New 
Zealand phasing out fossil fuel extraction.  Part VII will conclude the paper. 
 
II Climate change, fossil fuels and New Zealand 
A Fossil fuels and climate change 
"Fossil fuel" is the term used to refer to coal, tar sands, oil and natural gas.19  They are 
“fossil” fuels because they are the “compressed remains of ancient plants and animals”.20 
Burning fossil fuels results in the release of energy and the emission of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) and other gases to the atmosphere.21  CO2 is a greenhouse gas: along with other 
greenhouse gases such as water vapour and methane, it reflects infrared radiation back to 
Earth,22 thereby trapping energy within the Earth’s climate system.  The increasing 
concentrations of greenhouse gases (principally CO2) in the atmosphere as a result of fossil 
fuel combustion and other human activities are resulting in rising global average 
temperatures23 and increasingly volatile weather.24 Another effect of climate change will 
  
19 Nicholas A. Robinson, Wang Xi, Lin Harmon and Sarah Wegmueller (eds) Dictionary of Environmental 
and Climate Change Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2013) at 111. 
20 At 111. See also Neil A. Campbell, Jane B. Reece and others Biology (8th ed, Pearson, San Francisco, 2008) 
at 1231. 
21 Will Steffen and others Global Change and the Earth System: A Planet Under Pressure (Springer, 
Berlin/Heidelberg, 2009) at 143. 
22 Campbell and Reece, above n 20, at 1240. 
23 IPCC Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri 
and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. (IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 2014), Summary for Policy Makers at 2 – 3. 
24 At 7 – 8. 
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be sea-level rise, as a result of (among other factors) melting ice caps (due to warmer 
temperatures) and the expansion of the sea water as it gets warmer.25  Increasing CO2 
emissions also contribute to ocean acidification, as some of that CO2 dissolves in the 
ocean.26 The oceans have so far absorbed 90% of the extra energy trapped within the 
climate system between 1971 and 2010.27  The consequent warming of the surface of the 
oceans, along with ocean acidification, are likely to have serious impacts on coral reefs28 
and other marine ecosystems.  Terrestrial ecosystems will be impacted by climate change 
in a myriad of ways which will have impacts for human health and food security.29  Of 
concern is the potential for exacerbated warming caused by positive feedback loops.30  
There has already been close to 1ºC of warming since pre-industrial times due to 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.31  
B What is a "dangerous level" of climate change?  
The overall aim of the international climate regime as expressed in the 1992 UNFCCC is 
“the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic influence with the climate system.”32 Since the 15th 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009, most states have agreed 
that in order to achieve the UNFCCC’s aim, the goal should be to keep warming to well 
below 2ºC above pre-industrial levels.33  However, it is debateable whether 2ºC is actually 
a “safe limit”34 and more recently there has been discussion as to whether the goal should 
actually be to limit warming to below 1.5ºC, as particularly vulnerable countries consider 
that the projected local effects of a global temperature increase of 2ºC would be “beyond 
what their societies would be able to cope with, in the short or long term.”35  The wording 
  
25 Steffen and others, above n 21, at 152. 
26 IPCC, above n 23, Summary for Policy Makers at 4. 
27 At 4. 
28 Steffen and others, above n 21, at 154 – 155. 
29 IPCC, above n 23, Summary for Policy Makers at 13 – 15. 
30 Johan Rockström and others “A safe operating space for humanity” (2009) 46 Nature 472 at 473. 
31 At 2. 
32 UNFCCC, above n 1, art 2. 
33 Conference of the Parties, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the 
Conference of the Parties in Its Fifteenth Session Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009 – 
Addendum – Part 2: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Fifteenth Session, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010) at 5. 
34 Reto Knutti and others “A scientific critique of the two-degree climate change target” (2016) 9 Nature 
Geoscience 13. 
35 Joeri Rogelj and others “Energy system transformations for limiting end-of-century warming to below 
1.5ºC” (2015) 5 Nature Climate Change 519. 
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of the Paris Agreement is a compromise between these two positions; states aim to “hold… 
the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2ºC above pre-industrial levels 
and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels, 
recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change”.36 
C How much fossil fuel must be kept in the ground to stabilise the climate below 1.5 or 
2ºC? 
CO2 is a long-lived gas, with a proportion of CO2 emissions from the combustion of fossil 
fuels lingering in the atmosphere for hundreds if not thousands of years.37  This means that 
CO2 accumulates in the atmosphere and will contribute to the warming of the planet for 
many years to come.38  Given current emission trajectories, it seems that “[t]he window for 
limiting warming to below 1.5ºC with high probability and without temporarily exceeding 
that level already seems to have closed.”39  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (“IPCC”) suggests that to keep warming below 2ºC (with >66% probability), total 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions must be capped at 2900Gt40 (with a range of 2550 to 3150 
Gt depending on non-CO2 factors).41 It is estimated that about 1900 Gt had been emitted 
by 2011, leaving 1000Gt if warming is going to be limited to 2ºC.42  To keep warming 
below 1.5ºC (with 66% probability), cumulative emissions from 2011 would need to be 
limited to 400 Gt.43  If the probability is lowered to 50% and then 33%, the carbon budgets 
to keep below 1.5 ºC would be 550 Gt and 850 Gt respectively.44   
 
According to the IPCC, fossil fuel reserves45 in 2011 equate to between 3670 and 7100 Gt 
of CO2.46  Assuming the entire carbon budget was consumed by emissions from fossil fuel 
  
36 Paris Agreement, above n 2, at art 2(1)(a). 
37 Richard Millar and others “The cumulative carbon budget and its implications” (2016) 32 Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy 323 at 324; Reto Knutti and Joeri Rogelj “The legacy of our CO2 emissions: a clash of 
scientific facts, politics and ethics” (2015) 133 Climate Change 361 at 362. 
38 IPCC, above n 23, Summary for Policy Makers at 16. 
39 Joeri Rogelj and others “Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 2ºC” 
(2016) 534 Nature 631. 
40 "Gt" is an abbreviation of "gigatonne", meaning 1 billion tonnes. 
41 IPCC, above n 23, Synthesis Report, Table 2.2 at 64. 
42 At 63. 
43 Table 2.2, at 64. 
44 Table 2.2, at 64. 
45 “Reserves” are defined by the IPCC as “quantities able to be recovered under existing economic and 
operating conditions” while “resources” are “those where economic extraction is potentially feasible” – 
IPCC, above n 23, Synthesis Report, note f to Table 2.2, at 64. 
46 Table 2.2, at 64. 
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combustion, between 73 and 86 % of fossil fuel reserves (as at 2011) would need to remain 
unburned to achieve the target of keeping warming below 2ºC (with a 66% probability) 
and between 89 and 94% if warming is to be kept below 1.5ºC (with a 66% probability).  
Taking into account other emission sources,47 the percentage of fossil fuels that need to 
remain unburned rise to between 79 and 89% for a 2ºC target and 95 and 97% for a 1.5ºC 
target.  However, there has been no agreement between states as to whose reserves will be 
left in the ground as the international climate agreements (including the Paris Agreement) 
focus on the emissions of greenhouse gases within the state’s territory, rather than the 
quantity of fossil fuels that are being extracted within the state’s territory.  It has been 
estimated that if all of the world’s fossil fuel reserves were extracted and combusted, the 
result would between 6.4 and 9.5ºC of warming compared to pre-industrial levels,48 which 
would “have extremely profound impacts on ecosystems, human health, agriculture, 
economies and other sectors”.49 
D New Zealand’s relationship with fossil fuels 
Energy from the combustion of fossil fuels accounts for ~80% of global energy supply.50  
In 2014, New Zealand relied on fossil fuels for more than 50% of its energy supply; 31% 
from oil, 23% from gas and 7% from coal.51 The proportion of New Zealand’s energy 
supplied from renewable sources is unusually high (compared to other states) at 40%.52 
More than 80% of New Zealand’s electricity comes from renewable sources.53  Energy 
from fossil fuels is used for transport, for industrial processes, for residential uses (for 
instance, heating and cooking) and to generate electricity.54 
 
New Zealand is both an importer and exporter of fossil fuels.  New Zealand imports oil 
while exporting coal and oil.55 New Zealand’s oil is primarily exported to Australia; in 
2015, crude oil was the highest value commodity export to Australia despite the value of 
  
47 Anderson estimates 60Gt CO2 from deforestation and 150Gt of CO2 from cement production from 2011 
until their eradication later in the century: Kevin Anderson “Duality in climate science” (2015) 8 Nature 
Geoscience 898 at 899. 
48 Katarzyna B. Tokarska and others “The climate response to five trillion tonnes of carbon” (2016) Nature 
Climate Change (advance online publication, published 23 May 2016) at 4. 
49 At 5.  
50 International Energy Agency 2015 Key World Energy Statistics (2015) at 6. 
51 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Energy in New Zealand 2015 (2015) at 3 and 11 – 12. 
52 At 3. 
53 At 1.  
54 At 11 – 12. 
55 At 11 – 12. 
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trade in crude oil dropping by 46.2% from the previous year.56  New Zealand sells its oil 
rather than utilising it domestically because New Zealand’s crude oil is of high quality and 
consequently commands a high price.57  Lower quality oil primarily from the Middle East58  
is imported and refined in New Zealand to satisfy domestic demand.59  In contrast, the 
natural gas extracted from New Zealand’s gas fields is used within New Zealand for 
(among other uses) electricity production, and as a “feedstock” for the creation of other 
products such as methanol.60   
 
New Zealand’s first oil well was drilled in 1865.61  There have been various periods of 
increased exploration and production activity based on global trends.62  New Zealand’s oil 
and gas extraction industry is currently centred in and off-shore from Taranaki.63  New 
Zealand’s offshore resources have been underexplored compared to other developed 
countries; much of New Zealand’s EEZ and continental shelf has not been explored.64   
 
New Zealand had 25 active petroleum mining licences and permits in 2014,65 pursuant to 
which 14.448 million barrels of oil and condensate were extracted (14.934 million barrels 
in 2015)66 and 198.32 petajoules of gas supplied (182.37 petajoules in 2015).67.  As at 
1 January 2016, New Zealand’s probable reserves of natural gas were 79% depleted.68  
  
56 Statistics New Zealand Global New Zealand – International trade, investment, and travel profile: Year 
ended December 2015. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Statistics New Zealand, 23 May 2015) 
www.stats.govt.nz at Section 2: Principal Markets, Table 2.09 (Australia). 
57 MBIE, above n 51, at 26. 
58 At 27. 
59  Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Peer Review on Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms in New Zealand (Final 
Report, September 2015) at 28. 
60 MBIE, above n 51, at 36. 
61 David P. Grinlinton “The History and Development of Petroleum Law and Policy in New Zealand” (1993-
1996) 8 Otago L. Rev. 375. 
62 At 376. 
63 Venture Taranaki The Wealth Beneath Our Feet: The Next Steps (March 2015), at 10. 
64 At 10. 
65 MBIE, above n 51, at 20. 
66 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment “Energy in New Zealand 2015” (15 September 2015) 
www.mbie.govt.nz, at the web table titled “Oil”. 
67 At the web table titled “Gas”. 
68 Percentage derived from the data in the web tables titled “Gas” and “Reserves, Activity and Field Data” 
relating to the publication by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment “Energy in New Zealand 
2015” (15 September 2015) <www.mbie.govt.nz>.  The gas produced in 2015 (216.30 petajoules) was 
subtracted from the probably (P2) reserves remaining at 1 January 2015 (2323.1 petajoules) to find the 
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Without bringing any new fields online, the gas fields currently in production could satisfy 
domestic demand for close to ten years from that point.69  In contrast to the limited (known) 
reserves of oil and gas, coal, New Zealand’s largest fossil fuel reserve,70 is nowhere near 
to being depleted.  It is estimated that New Zealand has over 15 billion tonnes of coal,71 
though 80% of this is lignite72 – a low grade coal.  At least 6 billion tonnes of lignite is 
potentially recoverable.73  However, it is primarily the higher quality bituminous and sub-
bituminous coals that are extracted for consumption in New Zealand and for export.74  
3,389,512 tonnes of coal were extracted in New Zealand in 2015.75   2,815,696 tonnes were 
used within New Zealand in 2015 and 1,369,601 tonnes were exported.76  Two of the 
biggest users of coal are the Glenbrook Steel Mill and the Huntly Power Station.77  Dairy 
manufacturing is also a significant consumer of coal.78  Overall, 33% of coal used in New 
Zealand in 2015 was for electricity generation (including cogeneration) and 38% was used 
by the industrial sector (including dairy manufacturing).79 
 
According to a report commissioned by Venture Taranaki, the oil and gas sector directly 
contributed $1.0 billion in GDP to the economy in 2013 and provided the equivalent of 
5,068 full-time jobs.80  When indirect and induced effects are taken into account, those 
figures rise to $2.79 billion in GDP and 11,720 full-time jobs.81  In the 2013/14 financial 
year, the New Zealand government received $371 million in royalties from the extraction 
of oil and gas.82  In addition, it is estimated that around $300 million in company tax is 
  
probable reserves as at 1 January 2016 (2328.1 petajoules).  This was then compared to the ultimate probable 
natural gas reserves to determine what percentage of the ultimate reserves had already been utilised.  
69 The probable reserves as at 1 January 2016 (calculation described in the preceding footnote) was divided 
by the amount of gas produced in 2015 to determine how many years before the probable reserves would be 
depleted if production remained at the same level, the answer being 9.92 years. 
70 More specifically, lignite coal is New Zealand’s largest fossil fuel energy resource: MBIE, above n 51, at 
14. 
71 At 14. 
72 At 14. 
73 At 14. 
74 At 14. 
75 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment “Data tables for coal” (2016) www.mbie.govt.nz at 
Table 2: Annual Tonnes. 
76 At Table 2: Annual Tonnes. 
77 MBIE, above n 51, at 16. 
78 At 16. 
79 Percentages derived from MBIE, above n 75, at Table 2: Annual Tonnes. 
80 Venture Taranaki, above n 63, at 3. 
81 At 3. 
82 At 67. 
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paid each year by oil and gas exploration and production companies.83  There are some 
New Zealand-owned oil companies but there is significant investment in the oil and gas 
industry from foreign companies.84  In 2014, $2.065 billion was expended in relation to 
petroleum prospecting, exploration and production permits, $1.123 billion relating to 
exploration, appraisal and development wells and $98.28 million relating to seismic 
surveying and data processing.85 
E New Zealand’s green-house gas emissions 
New Zealand has the fifth-highest per capita emissions within the OECD.86  Unusually for 
a developed country, New Zealand is a net exporter of emissions,87 meaning that the 
production of all of New Zealand’s exports is more emissions intensive than the production 
of all the goods that it imports.  This is in no small part because of the significance of dairy 
and meat products to New Zealand’s export base, being respectively, New Zealand’s 
second and third largest commodity exports.88  Approximately 49% of New Zealand’s 
gross greenhouse gas emissions (measured in carbon dioxide equivalents) in 2014 came 
from agriculture,89 as cattle and sheep both produce methane, a more potent greenhouse 
gas than CO2.90  New Zealand’s high level of agricultural emissions is used as a 
justification as to why it will be more expensive for New Zealand to reduce its greenhouse 
gas emissions than it will be for other states.91  However, 51% of New Zealand’s emissions 
do not come from agriculture, meaning that there is still significant scope for New Zealand 
to take action to mitigate the greenhouse gases emitted in New Zealand.  Consideration of 
potential mitigation actions is beyond the scope of this paper.   
  
83 At 67. 
84 MBIE, above n 51, at 20. 
85 At 20. 
86 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development "Greenhouse gas emissions" OECD.Stat < 
stats.oecd.org>. 
87 Geoff Bertram "Border Carbon Adjustments and Climate Change Policy" in Jane Kelsey (ed) No Ordinary 
Deal: Unmasking the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 
2010) 136 at 144. 
88  Statistics New Zealand "Goods and Services Trade by Country: Year ended March 2016" (2 June 2016) 
<www.stats.govt.nz> at Table 3: Total exports, by top 30 categories. 
89 Ministry for the Environment New Zealand's Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990 – 2014 (20 May 2016) at 
viii. 
90 Peter Wilson "The Economics of Emissions Trading" in Alastair Cameron (ed) Climate Change Law and 
Policy in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) 127 at 159. 
91 New Zealand Government Submission to the ADP: New Zealand's Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution (7 July 2015) < www4.unfccc.int>. 
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F New Zealand and fossil fuel subsidies 
Unlike many countries around the world, New Zealand does not subsidise the consumption 
of fossil fuels.92  Indeed, New Zealand is part of an initiative called the “Friends of Fossil 
Fuel Subsidy Reform” which encourages states to phase out such “inefficient” subsidies.93  
However, New Zealand does subsidise or support the extraction of fossil fuels in New 
Zealand in a number of ways, including a tax exemption for foreign owned drilling rigs in 
New Zealand waters, specific tax rules relating to the deductibility of exploration 
expenditure and the funding of basic seismic surveying in New Zealand’s EEZ in order to 
encourage exploration by private firms.94  This support amounts to approximately $46 
million per year.95 
G Would New Zealand deciding to halt fossil fuel extraction make any difference to 
global carbon emissions? 
The functioning of the global economic system is dependent on the combustion of fossil 
fuels for energy and is set to remain so for decades to come.  In this context, it is a 
reasonable question as to whether New Zealand deciding to keep its fossil fuel reserves in 
the ground will have any impact on the total amount of fossil fuels extracted and combusted 
globally.  There is currently demand for oil from New Zealand; if New Zealand chooses 
not to supply oil, its current customers will simply purchase from some other producer.  
While modelling needs to be done on a case-by-case basis depending on the reserves 
involved, the modelling that has been done suggests that:96   
while it is unrealistic to assume that non-exploitation of any particular oil, gas or coal 
field will lead to avoided global emissions equal to 100 per cent of the emissions 
directly associated with that resource, given long-term substitutability and demand 
elasticities, the long-term avoided emissions coefficient will be greater than zero. The 
ultimate impact on global GHGs may be small, but it will not be meaningless. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the global impact of halting fossil fuel 
extraction in New Zealand. 
 
  
92 Vernon Rive "Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform: A New Zealand Perspective on the International Law 
Framework" (2016) 27 NZULR 73. 
93 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade "Fossil fuel subsidy reform" < www.mfat.govt.nz>. 
94 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Peer Review on Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms in New Zealand (Final 
Report, September 2015) at 7. 
95 WWF Fossil Fuel Finance in New Zealand - Part 1: Government Support (2013) at 6. 
96 Rive, above n 92, at 92. 
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In a simplistic sense, if between 72 and 97% of current fossil fuel reserves must not be 
combusted for the climate to stabilise at a level less than 1.5˚C or 2˚C above the pre-
industrial level, then the owners of that proportion of current known fossil fuel reserves are 
going to be unable to extract those reserves if the goal of the Paris Agreement is to 
achieved.  New Zealand is likely to be better placed, both legally and economically, than 
other states to be able to phase out extraction of its own fossil fuel reserves. 
 
III Regulation of fossil fuel extraction in New Zealand 
For a fossil fuel miner to be able to operate legally, that person will need a mining permit 
allowing them the right to extract a particular type of fossil fuel in a given area, permission 
to access the relevant area of land from its owner (if onshore) and resource consents from 
the relevant local authorities or the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in relation 
to the environmental effects of the proposed operation.  The miner will also have to comply 
with health and safety and hazardous substance regulations. 
A Rights to extract New Zealand’s fossil fuels 
1 Ownership of New Zealand’s fossil fuels 
All petroleum (defined to include all naturally occurring hydrocarbons excluding coal)97 
within New Zealand’s territory and EEZ belongs exclusively to the Crown.98  Prior to 1937, 
the owners of land under which oil and natural gas were located arguably had rights to 
those minerals.99  However, pursuant to the Petroleum Act 1937, the Crown retrospectively 
resumed any rights that landowners might have had to petroleum beneath their land.100 No 
compensation was paid by the Crown for the expropriation of land owners’ or Maori rights 
to petroleum beneath their land, despite the issue of the Treaty of Waitangi being raised in 
the Parliamentary process preceding the passing of the 1937 Act.101  The 1937 Act was 
supported by the major oil companies (some of which are still involved in New Zealand’s 
petroleum industry today).102  Coal was not expropriated in the same way; many of New 
Zealand’s coal reserves are under private ownership, as the Crown had not reserved rights 
to coal when the land passed into private ownership.103  The Crown Minerals Act 1991 
  
97 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 2(1). 
98 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 10. 
99 Grinlinton, above n 61, at 388 – 389. 
100 At 392. 
101 At 390. 
102 At 386. 
103 MBIE, above n 51, at 16. 
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(“CMA”) only applies to coal that is owned by the Crown, except that a prospecting permit 
can be issued to prospect for privately owned coal.104   
2 The purpose behind the fossil fuel permit scheme 
The CMA sets out the framework for allocation of permits to extract Crown owned 
minerals including petroleum. The provisions of the Crown Minerals Act were part of the 
Resource Management Bill (now the Resource Management Act 1991) when it was first 
introduced.105  However, the CMA was split into a separate bill and so the extraction of 
minerals is not subject to the RMA’s governing principle of sustainable management.  A 
purpose section was only inserted into the CMA in 2013; that purpose is “to promote 
prospecting for, exploration for, and mining of Crown-owned minerals for the benefit of 
New Zealand.”106  To that end, the CMA provides for: 107 
 
(a) the efficient allocation of rights to prospect for, explore for, and mine Crown 
owned minerals; and 
(b) the effective management and regulation of the exercise of those rights; and 
(c) the carrying out, in accordance with good industry practice, of activities in respect 
of those rights; and 
(d) a fair financial return to the Crown for its minerals. 
 
One of the tasks of the responsible Minister under the CMA is to prepare minerals 
programmes,108 setting out how the Minister and the chief executive will have regard to 
the Treaty of Waitangi for the purposes of the mineral programme109 and describing how 
the relevant officials will exercise their powers under the Act in relation to the particular 
mineral.110  The programme may include other information that the Minister considers to 
be likely to assist any person to use and understand the Act including general guidance on 
the scheme of the Act111 and how the relevant officials will interpret and apply specific 
provisions of the Act or regulations.112  Once in place, the Minister and relevant officials 
must comply with the minerals programme (to the extent it is not contrary to the Act).113  
  
104 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 30(1). 
105 Resource Management Bill 1989 (224-1), Part IX. 
106 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s1A. 
107 At s 1A(2). 
108 At s 5(c). 
109 At s 14(1)(b). 
110 At s 14(2)(a). 
111 At s 14(2)(b)(i). 
112 At s 14(2)(b)(ii). 
113 At s 22. 
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There is a minerals programme currently in place for petroleum:114 the Mineral Programme 
for Petroleum 2013 (“MPP”).  In relation to the interpretation of the purpose of the Act, 
the MPP states that:115  
 
The Minister interprets the words “promote prospecting for, exploration for, and 
mining of Crown owned minerals” as requiring the Minister and the Chief Executive 
to:  
(a)  ensure that parties interested in prospecting for, exploring for, and mining 
petroleum are able to do so as readily as possible within the mandate and provisions 
of the Act   
(b)  publicise and encourage interest and investment in prospecting for, exploring for, 
and mining New Zealand’s petroleum resources.  
  
It then goes on to state that “[a]n important component of promoting prospecting, 
exploration and mining is minimising sovereign risk for investors by providing for a stable 
and coherent regulatory regime for petroleum.”116  “Sovereign risk” is defined as “the risk 
that the government may unexpectedly change significant aspects of its policy and 
investment regime and the legal rights applying to investors to the detriment of 
investors.”117  According to the MPP: 118 
 
[t]he Minister considers that, within the context and mandate of the Act, “the benefit 
of New Zealand” is best achieved by increasing New Zealand’s economic wealth 
through maximizing the economic recovery of New Zealand’s petroleum resources.… 
Other important components of “the benefits of New Zealand”, including 
environmental considerations, are covered by other legislation. 
3 Types of permits 
Subject to a few minor exceptions, no one may prospect or explore for, or mine Crown 
owned minerals in land without the requisite permit.119  Permit holders own all minerals 
that they lawfully obtain in the course of activities authorised by the relevant permits.120  
The CMA provides for three levels of permit: prospecting, exploration and mining permits.  
  
114 Minerals Programme for Petroleum 2013, issued by the Minerals Programme for Petroleum 2013 Order 
(No 2) 2013. 
115 At [1.3(5)]. 
116 At [1.3(6)]. 
117 At 7, footnote 9. 
118 At [1.3(8)–(9)]. 
119 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 8. 
120 At s 31. 
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The CMA also provides for the grant of prospecting permits in relation to privately owned 
minerals.   
(a) Prospecting permits 
Prospecting is defined by the Act as “any activity undertaken for the purpose of identifying 
land likely to contain mineral deposits or occurrences”121 and includes geological, 
geochemical, and geophysical surveying, aerial surveying, the taking of samples by hand 
or hand held methods and the taking of small samples offshore by low-impact mechanical 
methods.122  Prospecting permits last for up to four years from the commencement date123 
but are usually issued for 2 years to encourage prospectors to carry out their work in a 
timely fashion.124 Petroleum prospecting permits are usually granted on a non-exclusive 
basis.125  A petroleum prospecting permit holder has no entitlement to an exploration or 
mining permit for the area in which they were permitted to prospect.126 
(b) Exploration permits 
Exploration is defined by the Act as “any activity undertaken for the purpose of identifying 
mineral deposits or occurrences and evaluating the feasibility of mining particular deposits 
or occurrences of 1 or more minerals; and includes any drilling, dredging, or excavations 
(whether surface or subsurface) that are reasonably necessary to determine the nature and 
size of a mineral deposit or occurrence”.127  Petroleum exploration permits last for up to 
15 years,128 with the possibility of extension for up to a further four years if the permit 
holder has made a discovery that has the potential to lead to the granting of a mining permit 
and the permit holder needs more time to appraise the extent and characteristics of the 
discovery.129  If a petroleum permit holder makes a discovery, provided the permit holder 
can satisfy the requirements for a mining permit, they are entitled to a mining permit for 
that discovery.130   
When an exploration permit is granted or when application for change to an exploration 
permit is made, the Minister may impose a condition requiring the permit holder to 
surrender their permit in relation to part of the permit area on two occasions during the 
  
121 At s 2(1). 
122 At s 2(1). 
123 At s 35(1)(a). 
124 MPP, above n 114, at [6.4(2)]. 
125 At [6.2(1)]. 
126 At [6.2(5)]. 
127 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 2(1). 
128 At s 35(3). 
129 At s 35A(1). 
130 At s 32(3). 
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course of the permit.131  For petroleum permit holders, the total area to be relinquished 
must not exceed 75% of the original permit area; for other minerals, the relinquished area 
must not exceed 50% of the original.132  
(c) Mining permits 
In the context of the CMA, mining means:133  
(a)… to take, win, or extract, by whatever means,— 
(i) a mineral existing in its natural state in land; or 
(ii) a chemical substance from a mineral existing in its natural state in land; and 
(b) includes— 
(i) the injection of petroleum into an underground gas storage facility; and 
(ii) the extraction of petroleum from an underground gas storage facility 
 
Mining permits last for up to 40 years,134 with the possibility of extension if the resource 
is not economically depleted at the end of that period.135  Mining permits also allow the 
permit holder to prospect and explore for the specified mineral within the permit area.136 
4 Permit conditions 
(a) Work programmes 
A feature of all three levels of permit is the requirement for the applicant to propose a work 
programme, setting out the surveying, exploration or mining work that they would 
undertake if granted the permit.137  The Minister must approve this work programme and 
it will be a condition of any permit granted that the work programme be fulfilled.138   
(b) Record keeping and information disclosure 
If granted a permit, the permit holder must keep detailed records and reports in respect of 
all prospecting, exploration, and mining activities undertaken in a form readily accessible 
at all reasonable times by the relevant officials.139  Except for information in respect of a 
petroleum prospecting permit, the records and reports will be available to any person on 
request on the earlier of either the expiry of 5 years from the date the information was 
  
131 At s 35C. 
132 At s 35C(3). 
133 At s 2(1). 
134 At s 35(7). 
135 At s 36(5). 
136 At s 30(2) – (3). 
137 At s 29A(1)(b). 
138 MPP, above n 114, at [4.8]. 
139 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 90(1). 
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obtained by the permit holder or the date of expiry of the permit and every subsequent 
permit in respect of that permit.140  For information supplied in relation to a petroleum 
prospecting permit, the information will be available from the earlier of the expiry of 15 
years after the information was obtained by the permit holder or the conclusion of a public 
tender process for exploration permits to the extent the information relates to land to which 
the public tender relates (except if the public tender concludes earlier than 5 years after the 
information was obtained, in which case it will be released when the 5 years have 
passed).141  The Act also makes provision for "speculative prospectors", meaning non-
exclusive petroleum prospecting permit holders who carry out activities under their permits 
for the sole purpose of on-selling the information obtained on a non-exclusive basis to 
petroleum explorers and producers.142 Information provided by a speculative prospector 
will only be made available to the public 15 years after it was obtained by the speculative 
prospector.143   
5 Allocation of permits 
There is no allocation system per se for petroleum prospecting permits: applicants simply 
apply and are assessed against the relevant criteria, the most important being whether "the 
work proposed under the work programme will increase knowledge of New Zealand’s 
petroleum resources."144  In contrast, New Zealand Petroleum & Minerals operates a 
competitive bidding programme to determine the allocation of petroleum exploration 
permits.145  A competitive process is usually not required in relation to mining permits as 
they are "most commonly allocated to an exploration permit holder who has discovered a 
petroleum field within the exploration permit area".146 
6 Royalties payable 
Petroleum is owned by the Crown and, as such, it expects a financial return for allowing 
miners to extract and sell it.  Petroleum exploration permit holders must pay an ad valorem 
royalty of 5% of the net sales revenues of the petroleum obtained under the permit,147 while 
petroleum mining permit holders must pay the higher of an ad valorem royalty of 5% of 
the net sales revenues of the petroleum obtained under the permit or an accounting profits 
  
140 At s 90(6). 
141 At s 90(7). 
142 At s 90C(7). 
143 At s 90D(3). 
144 MPP, above n 114, at [6.3(2)]. 
145 At [7.2(1)]. 
146 MPP, above n 114, at [8.2(1)]. 
147 Crown Minerals (Royalties for Petroleum) Regulations 2013, cl 13. 
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royalty of 20% of the accounting profits of the petroleum obtained under the permit.148  
Permit holders in relation to Crown-owned coal must pay an ad valorem royalty of 2% of 
the net sales revenue of the coal obtained if the accounting profits of the permit holder for 
the reporting period are less than or equal to $5 million.149  If the profits are greater than 
$5 million for the accounting period, the permit holder must pay the higher of an ad 
valorem royalty of 2% of the net sales revenue of the coal obtained or an accounting profits 
royalty of 10% of the accounting profit of the minerals obtained under the permit.150 
7 Changes to permit conditions 
The Minister may make changes to permit conditions during the currency of the permit 
with the prior written consent of the permit holder, on the application of the permit holder 
or in a manner (if any) provided in the permit.151  The Minister has greater powers to amend 
petroleum mining permits if the change made is "necessary to maximise the economic 
recovery of the petroleum in accordance with good industry practice."  If the permit holder 
objects to the change, the dispute will be determined by an independent expert who will 
decide whether the change should be made.152 
8 Revocation or transfer of permits to the Crown 
A permit can only be revoked or transferred to the Minister (in replacement for the permit 
holder) if the permit holder has breached a condition of the permit, the Act or the 
regulations, or if a payment of money to the Crown pursuant to the permit is more than 90 
days late.153  Before the Minister can revoke the permit, written notice must be given to the 
permit holder setting out the grounds on which the Minister intends to revoke the permit 
and giving the permit holder 40 working days after the notice is served for the permit holder 
to remove the grounds for the revocation or transfer or provide reasons why the permit 
should not be revoked or transferred.154  The Minister may revoke or transfer the permit 
after 41 working days if the breaches have not been remedied or, if after considering the 
permit holders arguments in opposition to the revocation, the Minister decides that there 
are still grounds for revoking or transferring the permit.155  If the Minister decides to revoke 
or transfer the permit, the permit holder has the right to appeal to the High Court on a point 
  
148 At cl 14. 
149 Crown Minerals (Royalties for Minerals Other than Petroleum) Regulations 2013, cl 13(1). 
150 At cl 13(4). 
151 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 36. 
152 At s 37. 
153 At s 39(1). 
154 At s 39(2). 
155 At s 39(3). 
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of law.156  The permit holder is still liable in respect of the permit or any condition of it or 
act under it up to the date of revocation or transfer.157   
B Essential ancillary permissions 
In order to be able to exercise their rights under their permits, permit holders must obtain 
permission to enter onto land where they plan to undertake prospecting, exploration or 
mining activities and obtain the necessary resource consents for those activities.   
1 Land access arrangements 
A permit holder can enter onto general land within the permit area to undertake minimum 
impact activities on giving the land owner 10 days' notice.158  An access arrangement must 
be made with a land owner if the permit holder wants to do more than minimum impact 
activities.159  For minerals other than petroleum, a dispute as to whether a permit holder 
should be granted access to land can be referred to arbitration only with the permission of 
the land owner or with the permission of the Minister.160  However, a petroleum permit 
holder can refer the matter to arbitration without the consent of the land owner.161  The 
arbitral result will be binding on both parties.  For Crown land, the permit holder must 
make an access arrangement with the relevant Minister.162  Permission to access land is not 
required for land in the common marine and coastal area (except if the land is listed in 
Schedule 4 of the CMA) or for land in the EEZ and extended continental shelf.163  
Prospecting, exploration or mining carried out below the surface of any land shall not 
constitute prospecting, exploration or mining on or in land if it is not likely to cause damage 
to the land's surface or to the owner or occupier of the land.164   
2 Resource consents 
Depending on the provisions of the relevant district and regional plans, permit 
holders (particularly exploration and mining permit holders) will require resource 
consent under the Resource Management Act 1991 for the effects of their 
  
156 At s 39(5). 
157 At s 39(7). 
158 At s 49(3). 
159 At s 53(2). 
160 At s 55(1) and s 66. 
161 MPP, above n 114, at [3.3(8)]. 
162 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 61(1). 
163 MPP, above n 144, at [3.2(4) – (5)]. 
164 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s57. 
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activities.165  For instance, if a permit holder intends to mine petroleum and wants to 
do so through the process of hydraulic fracturing ("fracking"), then they are likely 
going to require a consent to drill and construct the well (except if it is a permitted 
activity as it was in Taranaki),166 to discharge chemicals and water into the well,167 
and to discharge the waste products back into an empty well.168  District and regional 
councils are the relevant regulators onshore, while the EPA governs the resource 
consenting process offshore.169 
3 Other obligations 
A permit holder must also comply with the law relating to health and safety170 and to 
hazardous substances.  The hazardous substances regime will be particularly relevant to 
permit holders performing fracking.171 
C Regulation of coal 
If coal is owned by the Crown, then the permitting system under the CMA described above 
(except for the competitive bidding process) will apply to coal extraction.  If coal is 
privately owned, then the owner does not require a permit under the CMA to mine it but 
will still be subject to resource consent requirements and health and safety legislation. 
D Summary 
New Zealand's petroleum and minerals law provides for a stable system in which permit 
holders can exploit fossil fuel resources until exhaustion.  Under the CMA, the Crown is 
only able to revoke or transfer permits on limited grounds; and, in line with the purpose of 
the Act, there is no power for the Crown to revoke permits on the grounds relating to the 
threat of climate change.   
 
  
165 Michelle van Kampen and Bal Matheson "Minerals and petroleum" in Derek Nolan (ed) Environmental 
and Resource Management Law (5th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington 2015) 517 at 548. 
166 Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment Drilling for oil and gas in New Zealand: Environmental 
oversight and regulation (June 2014) at 29. 
167 Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment Evaluating the environmental impacts of fracking in 
New Zealand: An interim report (November 2012) at 58. 
168 At 61. 
169 Venture Taranaki, above n 63, at 26 – 27. 
170 Health and Safety at Work Act 2015. 
171 PCE, above n 168, at 51. 
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IV Legal options for halting fossil fuel extraction in New Zealand 
Phasing out fossil fuel extraction in New Zealand is likely to require Parliamentary 
intervention to amend the CMA, whatever timeframe is set for the phase out.   
A Constraints on executive action 
In New Zealand’s constitution, Parliament is sovereign.172  When exercising statutory 
powers, executive government must be careful not to go beyond the powers conferred on 
it by Parliament.173  On the application of a person with sufficient standing, the courts will 
review decisions of the executive for consistency with the law.174  Any decision of the 
executive to phase out fossil fuels could be the subject of a successful judicial review under 
the current scheme of the CMA - even a relatively straightforward decision to allow all 
existing permits to expire over time without issuing new permits. Such a decision would 
arguably inconsistent with the purpose of the Act,175 which is to promote prospecting, 
exploring and mining for minerals for the benefit of New Zealand.176 As it stands, the 
Minister has stated in the MPP that the phrase “of benefit to New Zealand” is interpreted 
to mean (in the context of the CMA) of the economic benefit to New Zealand.177  On that 
interpretation, discouraging fossil fuel extraction would likely be contrary to that purpose 
as the economic benefits of that action (for instance reducing the risk of oil spills, reducing 
New Zealand’s greenhouse gas emissions by stopping the flaring of gas, and maintaining 
New Zealand’s international reputation by making a contribution to global efforts to 
stabilise the climate) are harder to quantify in economic terms that the benefits of fossil 
fuel extraction (for instance jobs, royalties, and taxes).  Additionally, if the Minister made 
the decision to phase out fossil fuel extraction because of the impact on the climate if the 
fuels were combusted, that decision could also be challenged for taking into account an 
  
172 Philip A. Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2014) at [1.6.15]. 
173 At [22.1]. 
174 At [22.1]. 
175 Inconsistency with the purpose of the Act can be a ground for review (of bylaws in particular): see for 
instance Matthew Smith New Zealand Judicial Review Handbook (Brookers, Wellington, 2011) at [65.2]; 
Carroll v Attorney-General [1933] NZLR 1461 (CA) at 1478; JB International Ltd v Auckland City Council 
[2006] NZRMA 401 (HC) at [66]. 
176 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 1A. 
177 MPP, above n 114, at [1.3(7)-(8)]. 
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irrelevant consideration178 that is not listed in the (non-exclusive) list of factors to consider 
when making a decision whether or not to grant a permit.179   
 
Allowing all existing permits to expire without issuing new permits could take up to 55 
years as petroleum exploration permits last for up to 15 years180 and the subsequent mining 
permits that exploration permit holders are usually entitled to if they make a discovery181 
last for a further 40 years.182 If that decision was made in 2016 then it could take until 2071 
to complete the phase out of fossil fuel extraction.  The phase out of the mining of Crown-
owned coal would take slightly less time, as exploration permits only last for 10 years183 
and mining permits last 40 years,184 totalling 50 years.  Simply allowing permits to run out 
would not work in the case of privately owned coal as its owners do not require a CMA 
permit in order to mine it.  The rights of those owners to extract that coal would have to be 
removed if fossil fuel extraction was to be completely phased out.   
 
Phasing out fossil fuel extraction before 2071 would require the removal of some mining 
and exploration permit holders’ existing rights, those rights either to continue mining under 
an existing mining permit (or licence) or to the grant of a mining permit for a discovery 
made pursuant to an exploration permit. It is unlikely that it would be necessary to remove 
any rights of prospecting permit holders, given that those permits are of much shorter 
duration185 and (at least under the current MPP) confer no right to any subsequent 
permits.186 Under the CMA, the Minister’s power to revoke or transfer permits is limited 
to circumstances when the permit holder has breached the permit, regulations or Act or 
when the permit holder is more than 90 days overdue in paying any amount due under the 
CMA or regulations.187  The Minister has no power to revoke permits on any other ground, 
including the impact on the climate of combusting the extracted fossil fuels.  The Minister 
can only amend petroleum mining permits with the permission of the permit holder or if 
  
178 Taking into account irrelevant considerations can be a ground for review: see for instance Smith, above n 
177, at [61.4]; Berryman v Solicitor-General [2008] 2 NZLR 772 (HC) at [113]. 
179 Section 29A(2) of the Crown Minerals Act 1991 lists the factors that the Minister must be satisfied of 
before granting a permit. 
180 At s 35(3). 
181 At s 32(3). 
182 At s 35(7). 
183 At s 35(5). 
184 At s 35(7). 
185 At s 35(1). 
186 MPP, above n 114, at [4.3(1)]. 
187 Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 39. 
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the change is necessary to maximise the economic recovery of the petroleum in accordance 
with good industry practice.188 
 
The executive also has the power to set the level of royalties that permit holders must pay 
to the Crown.189  However, an increase to the royalties payable to take into account the 
climate impact of the combustion of the extracted fuel or to discourage permit holders from 
extracting fossil fuels could also be subject to judicial review for inconsistency with the 
purpose of the CMA and the objective that the Crown receives a fair financial return from 
its mineral resources.190   
 
Local authorities are also hampered in their ability to prevent drilling for petroleum or the 
extraction of coal within their jurisdiction: the RMA is focussed on regulating the 
environmental effects of activities and to the extent that fossil fuel extraction has similar 
impacts to other activities that are allowed in the relevant plan, local authorities are not 
able to decline consent for a fossil fuel extraction project on philosophical grounds.191  
Local authorities are not allowed to consider the effects on the climate from the combustion 
of fossil fuels when deciding whether or not to grant resource consent for a fossil fuel 
extraction project.192   
B Consequences of legislative action 
If New Zealand decided to phase out fossil fuel extraction in such a way that involved the 
removal of permit holders existing rights, then legislation would be the most appropriate 
and effective method for such a policy change to be implemented.193  Parliament is 
sovereign in New Zealand’s constitution and so primary legislation cannot be overturned 
by the courts.  It is therefore appropriate that New Zealand’s elected representatives, the 
House of Representatives, should have an opportunity to consider to what extent (if any) 
existing permit holders’ rights should be infringed and, if so, whether they should be 
  
188,At s 37. 
189 At ss 34 and 105A. 
190 At s 1A. 
191 van Kampen and Matheson, above n 167 at [7.38]. 
192 West Coast ENT Inc v Buller Coal Ltd [2014] 1 NZLR 32 (SC). 
193 Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation (October 2014) at 
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compensated for that infringement.194  This is also consistent with the principle that 
property rights should only be removed using clear language.195 
1 Would there be any remedy for investors under New Zealand domestic law? 
If legislation was passed phasing out fossil fuel extraction in New Zealand and its EEZ 
without providing for compensation then it is unlikely that New Zealand investors (or 
foreign investors making a claim in the New Zealand courts) would be entitled to any 
compensation for the removal of their rights.  There is no common law “right to property” 
in New Zealand which would allow former permit holders to sue the government for 
compensation the removal of their rights.196  Section 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search 
or seizure, whether of the person, property, or correspondence or otherwise.”  However, 
while early authority could be read as suggesting that this provision did confer a right to 
protection of property,197 this right has since been interpreted as being grounded in the 
protection of a citizen’s reasonable expectations of privacy.198  It is now unlikely that s 21 
will be interpreted to confer a general right to the protection of private property.199  Even 
if s 21 was interpreted that way, the courts may find that the restriction is justified (under 
s 5) in a free and democratic society, given the context of climate change.  While the Public 
Works Act 1981 provides compensation when land is taken for public works,200 this 
statutory protection does not extend to the removal of other types of “property” broadly 
defined. 
 
  
194 Petra Butler “When is an Act of Parliament an Appropriate Form of Regulation? – Regulating the Internet 
as an Example” in Susy Frankel and Deborah Ryder (eds) Recalibrating Behaviour: Smarter Regulation in 
a Global World (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2013) 489 at 510 - 511. 
195 Skycity Auckland Ltd v Gambling Commission [2008] 2 NZLR 182 (CA) at [32]. 
196 Cooper v Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 480 (HC) at 483; Richard P. Boast and Neil C. Quigley 
“Regulatory Reform and Property Rights in New Zealand” in Susy Frankel (ed) Learning from the Past, 
Adapting to the Future: Regulatory Reform in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) 127 at 130.. 
197 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2nd ed, LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2015) at 926 – 929, citing Alwen Industries v Comptroller of Customs (1993) 1 HRNZ 574 (HC) 
and Wilson v New Zealand Customs Service (1999) 5 HRNZ 134 (HC). 
198 Hamed v R [2012] 2 NZLR 305 (SC) at 319. 
199 Butler and Butler, above n 199, at [18.7.1]; Brookers Human Rights Law (online ed) [BOR21.06]. 
200 Public Works Act 1981, s 60. 
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V New Zealand’s international investment obligations 
A New Zealand’s investment treaties 
New Zealand is a relative newcomer to investment treaties and, in particular, to investor-
state arbitration clauses within those treaties,201 commonly referred to as “investor-state 
dispute settlement” or “ISDS” clauses.  New Zealand is party to investment agreements 
with Australia,202 China,203 Hong Kong,204 Malaysia,205 Singapore,206 Thailand,207 South 
Korea,208 and the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (“ASEAN”).209  
Most of these investment agreements are contained within wider free trade agreements 
(“FTAs”) with those states or economies.210  All of the investment agreements apart from 
those with Australia provide for ISDS.   
 
As described in the introduction to this paper, New Zealand has signed and is in the process 
of ratifying the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (“TPPA”) with Australia, the United 
States of America, Canada, Mexico, Japan, Chile, Peru, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore and 
Brunei Darussalam.  The TPPA is not yet in force; it will enter into force 60 days after all 
the original signatories have notified the Depositary in writing of the completion of their 
  
201 David Williams QC, Amokura Kawharu and others Williams & Kawharu on Arbitration (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2011) at 871-872. 
202 Protocol on Investment to the New Zealand - Australia Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
[2013] NZTS 1 (signed 16 February 2011, entered into force 1 March 2013). Australia is also party to the 
ASEAN FTA. 
203 Free Trade Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China [2008] NZTS 19 (signed 7 April 2008, entered into force 1 October 2008). 
204 Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of Hong Kong for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments [1995] NZTS 14 (signed 6 July 1995, entered into force 5 August 
1995). 
205 New Zealand – Malaysia Free Trade Agreement [2010] NZTS 9 (signed 26 October 2009, entered into 
force 1 August 2010).  Malaysia is also party to the ASEAN FTA. 
206 Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership [2001] NZTS 1 
(signed 14 November 2000, entered into force 1 January 2001).  Singapore is also party to the ASEAN FTA. 
207 New Zealand - Thailand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement [2005] NZTS 8 (signed 19 April 2005, 
entered into force 1 July 2005).  Thailand is also party to the ASEAN FTA. 
208 Free Trade Agreement between New Zealand and the Republic of Korea (signed 23 March 2015, entered 
into force 20 December 2015). 
209 Agreement establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area [2010] NZTS 1 (signed 27 
February 2009, entered into force 1 January 2010). 
210 The investment agreements with Australia, China, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Korea and ASEAN are 
all part of wider FTAs. 
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applicable legal procedures.211  If this has not occurred within two years of the date of 
signing the Agreement, it will enter in force 60 days after that date if at least six of the 
original signatories accounting for at least 85% of combined GDP of the original 
signatories had given the Depositary notice within that period that their applicable legal 
procedures were complete,212 or 60 days after the date when that threshold is met.213 Before 
it enters into force, US law requires the US President to certify that the law of each party 
accords with the TPPA provisions.214  While there is now some doubt as to whether the 
TPPA will enter into force as the candidates from both major parties in the US Presidential 
election have stated their opposition to the TPPA,215 the New Zealand government is taking 
steps to ratify the TPPA.216  If it comes into force, New Zealand is likely to be at more risk 
from investment claims under the TPPA than under its other investment treaties with ISDS 
clauses because of the size of the TPP region217 and because the TPPA includes the most 
litigious of countries in this area - the USA.218  For this reason, the following analysis will 
focus on the provisions of the TPPA.   
1 New Zealand-Australia investment protection regime 
Australia is the largest source of foreign capital in New Zealand219 and on that basis could 
be expected to generate the most investment treaty claims.  However, both countries have 
agreed that the ISDS provisions in the TPPA220 and in the entire investment chapter in 
ASEAN FTA will not apply between Australia and New Zealand.221 There is no ISDS 
  
211 TPPA, art 30.5(1). 
212 Art 30.5(2). 
213 Art 30.5(3). 
214 Jane Kelsey The TPPA: Treaty Making, Parliamentary Democracy, Regulatory Sovereignty & the Rule 
of Law (Expert Paper #1, Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement New Zealand Expert Paper Series, November 
2015) at 18. 
215 Associated Press “Brushing off Clinton’s critique, Obama presses ahead on TPP” The New Zealand 
Herald (online ed, 3 August 2016). 
216 At the time of writing, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Amendment Bill 2016 (133-1) is before 
the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee. The Committee’s report is due on 12 November 
2016. 
217 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade National Interest Analysis  at [4.8.2] 
218 Amokura Kawharu TPPA: Chapter 9 on Investment (Expert Paper #2, Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement New Zealand Expert Paper Series, November 2015) at 17. 
219 Statistics New Zealand “Balance of Payments and International Investment Position: Year ended 31 March 
2015” (24 September 2015)  <www.stats.govt.nz> at Table 25. 
220 New Zealand – Australia Side Letter relating to the Relationship between TPP and Other Agreements 
(signed 4 February 2016, not yet in force). 
221 Exchange of Letters constituting an Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the 
Government of Australia on the Application of the Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New 
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provision in the investment protocol of New Zealand’s Closer Economic Relations Treaty 
with Australia.222  Any breach of an investment protection by New Zealand against an 
Australian national would have to be resolved between the Australian and New Zealand 
governments, rather than directly between the investor and the New Zealand government.  
B What is an “investment”? 
Chapter 9 of the TPPA defines an “investment” as:223 
 
every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the 
characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of 
capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk. 
Forms that an investment may take include:  
. (a)  an enterprise;   
. (b)  shares, stock and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; … 
(g) licences, authorisations, permits and similar rights conferred pursuant to the 
Party’s law…  
C Key investment protections 
Despite the number of investment treaties in force today, many of them contain “a 
relatively standard menu of investor rights such as national treatment, fair and equitable 
treatment, and compensation for expropriation.”224 These three protections, along with 
most-favoured-nation treatment will be examined below. All four are present in the 
TPPA225 and are present in most of New Zealand’s other investment treaties in various 
forms.226   
1 Compensation for expropriation 
Article 9.8 of the TPPA provides that a Party shall not expropriate a covered investment, 
directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation except:227 
  
Zealand Free Trade Area to the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement and 
associated instruments (signed 27 February 2009, entered into force 1 January 2010). 
222 Protocol on Investment to the New Zealand - Australia Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
[2013] NZTS 1 (signed 16 February 2011, entered into force 1 March 2013). 
223 TPPA, above n 10, at art 9.1. 
224 Williams and Kawharu, above n 201, at 796. 
225 TPPA, above n 10, at arts 9.4 (National Treatment), 9.5 (Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment), 9.6 
(Minimum Standard of Treatment, including fair and equitable treatment) and 9.8 (Expropriation and 
Compensation). 
226 See the tables at pages 897 – 898 of Williams and Kawharu, above n 201.  The FTA with South Korea 
(which entered into force after publication of Williams and Kawharu) also includes all four protections. 
227 TPPA, above n 10, at art 9.8.1. 
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(a)  for a public purpose; 
(b)  in a non-discriminatory manner;   
(c)  on payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation …; and   
(d)  in accordance with due process of law.   
 
That compensation is to be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated 
investment immediately before the expropriation took place228 and not reflect any change 
in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier.229  The 
compensation is to be paid without delay230 and be fully realisable and freely 
transferable.231  The TPPA further defines in Annex 9-B what the parties understand by 
direct232 and indirect expropriation233 and non-discriminatory (and non-compensable) 
regulatory actions by the Parties.234   
2 National treatment 
Article 9.4 of the TPPA provides that each Party will accord to investors of the other Parties 
and covered investments treatment that is no less favourable than it accords, in like 
circumstances to its own investors and their investment in its territory.  This is a relative 
standard: it depends on how well a state treats its own investors.235   
3 Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
Article 9.5 of the TPPA provides that each Party shall accord to investors of another Party 
(and their investments) treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to investors of any other Party or non-Party with respect to the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other 
disposition of investments in its territory.  It also confirms that the article does not 
encompass international dispute resolution procedures or mechanisms, such as the ISDS 
provisions in Section B.236  Otherwise, it might be possible for this clause to be used to 
  
228 Art 9.8.2(b). 
229 Art 9.8.2(c). 
230 Art 9.8.2(a). 
231 Art 9.8.2(d). 
232 Annex 9-B, cl 1. 
233 Annex 9-B, cl 3. 
234 Annex 9-B, cl 3(b). 
235 Williams and Kawharu, above n 201, at 802. 
236 TPPA, above n 10, art 9.5(3). 
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import more favourable dispute resolution clauses from the respondent Party’s other 
investment treaties.237 
4 Fair and equitable treatment 
In some investment treaties, the “fair and equitable treatment” standard is a standalone 
provision.238  However, in article 9.6 of the TPPA, it is explicitly linked to the customary 
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.239  “Fair and equitable treatment” and “full 
protection and security” are given as examples of the minimum standard of customary 
international law in this area.240  The mere fact that a Party takes or fails to take an action 
that may be inconsistent with an investor’s expectations does not constitute a breach of 
article 9.6, even if there is loss or damage to the covered investment as a result.241  Annex 
9-A defines further what the Parties mean by customary international law in this area.242  
Importantly, the investment chapter of New Zealand’s FTA with China does not link “fair 
and equitable treatment” to the minimum standard of customary international law.243  This 
may allow a TPPA investor to argue that there is a stand-alone standard of “fair and 
equitable treatment” in the China FTA and that it should apply to them under the most-
favoured-nation provision. 
D Remedies for foreign investors 
Part B of Chapter 9 of the TPPA sets out an ISDS scheme.  Aggrieved investors can choose 
to take the respondent state to arbitration under the rules of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) (provided both the respondent state and the 
investor’s home state are both party to the relevant convention)244, the ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) Arbitration Rules or any other arbitral institution that the claimant and 
respondent agree on.245 New Zealand has ratified the ICSID Convention.246  The arbitral 
tribunal will decide the issues in dispute in accordance with the TPPA and applicable rules 
  
237 Williams and Kawharu, above n 201, at 807 - 808. 
238 At 811. 
239 TPPA, above n 10, at art 9.6.2. 
240 At art 9.6.2(a) and (b). 
241 At art 9.6.4. 
242 TPPA, above n 10, at Annex 9-A. 
243 China-New Zealand FTA, above n 205, at art 143. 
244 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 575 
UNTS 159 (concluded 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966). 
245 TPPA, above n 10, at art 9.19.4. 
246 Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act 1979. 
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of international law.247  The arbitral tribunal may award monetary damages (plus any 
applicable interest) and/or restitution of property248 but shall not award punitive 
damages.249 
E Summary 
The TPPA provides the usual range of investment protections found in most investment 
treaties.  It protects the power of the state to regulate by restrictively defining customary 
international law and expropriation, as well as preventing the use of the most-favoured-
nation provision to incorporate ISDS clauses from other treaties.  
 
VI Would New Zealand have to compensate foreign investors for phasing out 
fossil fuel extraction? 
It is impossible to give a conclusive answer as to whether an arbitral tribunal would require 
the New Zealand government to compensate foreign investors involved in fossil fuel 
extraction industry if it decided to phase out that extraction, as it will depend on the facts 
of the particular claim (including how New Zealand decided to go about phasing out fossil 
fuel extraction) and the particular arbitrators’ views of investment law generally and the 
wording of the particular treaty.  Arbitral awards technically apply only to the dispute 
which they resolved:250 there is no system of precedent though arbitrators tend to refer to 
previous arbitral awards to find support for their own decisions.251  It is difficult to predict 
with any certainty which way arbitrators will decide as there have been cases with very 
similar (or even the same facts) but with different arbitral outcomes.252 However, it is still 
useful to set out the relevant questions, outline some of the arguments that New Zealand 
could raise to defend a claim and describe the options that an arbitrator could have to decide 
in New Zealand’s favour.  This analysis indicates that there are certain steps that New 
Zealand should take when phasing out fossil fuel extraction to minimise the chance of 
breaching the TPPA or other investment treaties. 
  
247 TPPA, above n 10, at art 9.25. 
248 Art 9.29.1. 
249 Art 9.29.6. 
250 See for instance art 9.29.7 of the TPPA, above n 10. 
251 Florian Grisel “The Sources of Foreign Investment Law” in Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn and Jorge 
E. Viñuales (eds) The Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2014) 213. 
252 Williams and Kawharu, above n 201. 
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A Would the removed rights be “investments”?  
Part IV of this paper established that in order to phase out fossil fuels before 2071, the 
rights of current exploration and mining permits for petroleum and Crown-owned coal 
would have to be curtailed in some fashion.  The rights of owners of coal reserves to extract 
their coal would also have to be removed.  Those actions, if taken, would also remove the 
value of petroleum prospecting permits and the information collected pursuant to those 
permits.  Phasing out fossil fuel extraction may also have the effect of diminishing the 
value of intellectual property rights related to fossil fuel extraction, for example, fracking 
techniques.253  To come within the protection of the TPPA or other investment agreements, 
the rights that would be removed when phasing out fossil fuel extraction must be 
“investments” as defined by the TPPA.  The definition in article 9.1 specifically includes 
both intellectual property rights and “licences, authorisations, permits and similar rights 
conferred pursuant to the Party’s law”, though whether licences or permits are investments 
will depend on the nature and extent of the rights under the permit.254  Given the duration 
of the rights involved (up to 40 years for mining permits), the risks that exploration and 
mining companies take, and the infrastructure they require, it seems likely that permits 
under the CMA would be investments under the TPPA.  
B Would those rights have been expropriated? 
If New Zealand did phase out fossil fuel extraction, it would be for public interest reasons: 
to limit the emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere; to minimise the risk of oil 
spills or of water contamination or of mining disasters.  It would be important to make 
these links explicit when setting up the scheme to phase out fossil fuels.  Even a lawful 
expropriation must be done for a public purpose.  
 
Depending on the phase out method chosen, the phasing out process could be classed as 
direct expropriation (if the government takes over the permits) or indirect expropriation 
which has an equivalent effect but without formal transfer of title.  If it is either direct or 
indirect expropriation, then compensation must be paid.  However, the public purpose 
might prevent the measures from being classed as expropriation at all though it is difficult 
to draw the line between indirect expropriation and non-compensable regulatory actions.  
Annex 9-B provides that:  
 
  
253 The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment notes that there is only one company operating in 
New Zealand which is able to carry out hydraulic fracturing: PCE, above n 167, at 27. 
254 TPPA, above n 10, Chapter 9, footnote 4. 
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Non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the 
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations, except in rare circumstances.  
 
Whether an action is indirect expropriation or legitimate non-compensable regulation will 
be considered on a case-by-case basis, assessing among other factors, the economic impact 
of the government action, the extent to which the government action interferes with 
distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of the government 
action.  When considering the expectations of the investor, the reasonableness of those 
expectations will be analysed taking into account the binding nature of any written 
assurances and the nature and extent of governmental regulation in the relevant sector.  On 
the one hand, a permit from the New Zealand government stating that an investor was 
allowed to mine a particular fossil fuel resource would be thought to be binding.  On the 
other hand, the fossil fuel extraction sector is the subject of many overlapping layers of 
regulation, in which case it may be reasonable to expect that the government could at some 
stage change how the sector was organised, particularly in the context of climate change.   
C Would there have been a breach of the minimum standard of customary 
international law? 
The classic statement as to what would amount to a breach of the minimum standard of 
customary international law in relation to foreign investors comes from Neer v United 
Mexican States, a 1926 Mexican Claims Commission decision which stated that:255 
 
… the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should 
amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of 
governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and 
impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency 
 
There is debate as to whether the standard has become more friendly to investors over 
time.256  Article 9.6 of the TPPA identifies two strands of the minimum standard: fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security.   The only example given in the article 
of the obligations under “fair and equitable treatment” is the obligation “not to deny justice 
in criminal, civil or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the 
principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world”.  While 
article 9.6.4 states that “the mere fact that a Party takes or fails to take an action that may 
  
255 Neer v United Mexican States 4 R Int’l Arb Awards 60 (15 October 1926) as cited in Williams and 
Kawharu, above n 201 at 810. 
256 At 810. 
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be inconsistent with an investor’s expectations does not constitute a breach of this Article, 
even if there is loss or damage to the covered investment as a result”, it does not provide 
guidance as to the proper role of investor expectations under this standard.  Given the New 
Zealand government’s current attitude, which is to promote fossil fuel extraction, and its 
past behaviour, maintaining the royalty rates and license types of previous mining 
legislation and only applying new legislation to new applications, foreign investors may 
have reasonable expectations that they will be able to rely on the licenses/permits given to 
them by the New Zealand government.  Despite the public purpose for phasing out fossil 
fuel, it may not be an attractive argument to an arbitrator that New Zealand should be able 
to breach the expectations of investors to uphold the permits without compensating them 
in some way for the losses suffered in reliance on the permits.  
D Do New Zealand’s obligations under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement lend 
weight to the argument that there is a legitimate public purpose for phasing out of 
fossil fuel extraction? 
The UNFCCC sets out the framework for international cooperation on climate change.  All 
of states that New Zealand has investment treaties with are parties to the UNFCCC which 
enjoys near universal membership.  If the UNFCCC contains a duty to promote the 
conservation of fossil fuel reserves or to protect fossil fuel reserves, and New Zealand acted 
in accordance with that duty when phasing out fossil fuels, it would be difficult for any 
investors to argue that New Zealand’s actions were not for a public purpose and done in 
good faith.  If such a duty exists, it could also provide an impetus for New Zealand to 
change its attitude towards fossil fuel extraction, given that New Zealand would currently 
be in breach of that duty as its the current fossil fuel extraction regime encourages the 
depletion rather than the conservation of those reserves.  
1 No mention of fossil fuels in the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement 
One of the criticisms levelled at the international climate regime is that its substantive 
obligations completely ignore supply-side factors.257  Emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion are the major component of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions258 and 
yet fossil fuels are not mentioned in the Paris Agreement.  An earlier draft of the Paris text 
mentioned fossil fuels but only in relation to the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies.259  The 
primary focus of the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement is on reducing 
  
257 Michael Lazarus, Peter Erickson and Kevin Tempest Supply-side climate policy: the road less taken 
(Stockholm Environment Institute, Working Paper 2015-13, 2015) at 5. 
258 IPCC, above n 23, Summary for Policy-Makers at 5. 
259 Rive, above n 92, at 84, footnote 59. 
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greenhouse gas emissions and it is up to the individual state what actions they will take to 
reduce the greenhouse gas emissions within their territory.260   
 
Given that fossil fuels are not mentioned at all in the Paris Agreement, it would seem 
unlikely that there is any sort of obligation on New Zealand under the Paris Agreement 
(should it come into force) to limit fossil fuel extraction.  However, there arguably is an 
obligation on all states (as far as they are able) to promote keeping fossil fuels in the ground, 
pursuant to article 5(1) of the Paris Agreement and article 4(d) of the UNFCCC, as well as 
a specific obligation on states listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC (including New Zealand) 
to protect their fossil fuel reserves.  Article 5(1) of the Paris Agreement provides that: 
 
Parties should take action to conserve and enhance, as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs 
of greenhouse gases as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1(d) of the Convention, 
including forests. 
 
Article 4(1) of the UNFCCC provides that:  
 
All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and 
circumstances, shall: … 
(d) Promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation 
and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including biomass, forests and oceans as well as 
other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems; 
 
Under article 4(2)(a) of the UNFCCC, New Zealand, as a party listed in Annex I to 
the UNFCCC, additionally agreed to: 
 
adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate 
change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting 
and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs 
2 Are fossil fuel reserves “sinks” or “reservoirs” for the purposes of the UNFCCC? 
For states to have an obligation pursuant to article 4(1)(d) and article 4(2)(a) of the 
UNFCCC in relation to the conservation of fossil fuel reserves, fossil fuels must either be 
a sink or reservoir of greenhouse gases. 
  
260 Jorge E. Viñuales Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2012) at 255. 
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(a) "Sinks" and "reservoirs" 
“Sink” is defined in the UNFCCC as “any process, activity or mechanism which removes 
a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere”261 
while “reservoir” is defined as “a component or components of the climate system where 
a greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored.”262  Prima facie, the 
definition of reservoir could be read as requiring a reservoir to be a store of the greenhouse 
gas itself; for example, a tank of CO2.  This is clearly not what it means as the non-exclusive 
list of examples in article 4(1)(d) includes forests and other ecosystems.  Such systems do 
not store carbon as CO2 or as methane; those gases would only be released on combustion 
or decomposition of the biomatter.   
Fossil fuels reserves are not greenhouse gas “sinks” but could be “reservoirs” as they are 
stores of greenhouse gases, directly in the case of natural gas reserves and pockets of coal 
seam gas (the main component of both being methane, a potent greenhouse gas)263 or 
indirectly in the case of oil and coal which must be combusted to produce (among other 
substances) CO2, a greenhouse gas.   
However, for fossil fuel reserves to be a "reservoir" under the UNFCCC, then they must 
also be a component of the "climate system" as defined by that same treaty.   
(b) "Climate system" and "geosphere" 
The definition of “climate system” in article 1(3) of the UNFCCC provides that “climate 
system” means “the totality of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere and geosphere and 
their interactions.”  The UNFCCC does not define any of the four “spheres” mentioned in 
that definition.  However, definitions of "atmosphere", "biosphere" and "geosphere" were 
provided in the training materials prepared by the Consultative Group of Experts (“CGE”) 
to assist non-Annex I countries with the preparation of their national communications under 
the UNFCCC.  The CGE was established by the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC 
to help non-Annex I countries to meet their UNFCCC obligations.264  The training 
  
261 UNFCCC, art 1(8). 
262 Art 1. 
263 Robinson and others, above n 19, at 54 and 179. 
264 Conference of the Parties, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on Its Fifth Session, Held in Bonn from 25 October to 5 November 1999 – 
Addendum – Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Fifth Session, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1999/6/Add.1 (2 February 2000) at 19. 
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materials (prepared for workshops in 2004 and 2005) include a glossary of relevant 
terms: 265 
 
Atmosphere. The mixture of gases surrounding the earth…. 
Biosphere. The living and dead organisms found near the earth's surface in parts of the 
lithosphere, atmosphere, and hydrosphere.… 
Geosphere. The soils, sediments, and rock layers of the Earth's crust, both continental 
and beneath the ocean floors. 
 
The only component of the climate system (as defined by the UNFCCC) that fossil fuel 
reserves could fit within is the “geosphere.”  The proposition that fossil fuels are part of 
the geosphere and are a reservoir of greenhouse gases is leant support by the definition of 
“carbon cycle” in the CGE glossary:266 
 
All carbon reservoirs and exchanges of carbon from reservoir to reservoir by various 
chemical, physical, geological, and biological processes.  Usually thought of as a 
series of the four main reservoirs of carbon interconnected by pathways of exchange. 
The four reservoirs, regions of the Earth in which carbon behaves in a systematic 
manner, are the atmosphere, terrestrial biosphere (usually includes freshwater 
systems), oceans, and sediments (includes fossil fuels).  Each of these global 
reservoirs may be subdivided into smaller pools, ranging in size from individual 
communities or ecosystems to the total of all living organisms (biota). [Emphasis 
added] 
3 What do the duties in articles 4(1)(d) and 4(2)(a) require New Zealand to do in relation 
to fossil fuel reserves?  
Having established that fossil fuel reserves are arguably reservoirs for the purposes of the 
UNFCCC, the next step is to establish what states might have to do in relation to fossil fuel 
reserves to fulfil their duties under article 4.  The obligation expressed under art 4(1)(d) is, 
to promote sustainable management of reservoirs and promote and cooperate in the 
conservation and enhancement of reservoirs and sinks, while the obligation on Annex I 
parties under art 4(2)(a) is to protect and enhance sinks and reservoirs.  "Promote" is 
defined in the Chambers Dictionary as meaning "to help forward… to further; to further 
  
265 Consultative Group of Experts “Materials for the hands-on training workshops of the Consultative Group 
of Experts on national communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention”. Available 
at http://unfccc.int/resource/cd_roms/na1/ghg_inventories/english/8_glossary/Glossary.htm. 
266 Ibid. 
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the progress of"267 while "co-operate" is defined simply as "to work together".268  "Protect" 
and "enhance" are stronger obligations; "protect" is defined in the Chambers Dictionary as 
meaning "to shield from danger, injury, change, capture or loss; to defend; to strengthen"269 
while "enhance" is defined as meaning "to raise in value or quality; …to add to or increase; 
to make more important; to improve".270   
 
“Protect” fossil fuel reserves could encompass taking steps to phase out fossil fuels: it 
would be shielding those reserves from loss.  Even the lesser duty of promoting 
conservation of fossil fuel reserves would support some sort of change to the fossil fuel 
extraction regime, moving away from active encouragement by the government to a neutral 
or negative position on fossil fuel extraction. 
 
In summary, on the ordinary meaning of the words, New Zealand does have a duty to 
protect its fossil fuel reserves under art 4(2) and a lesser duty (to promote their 
conservation) under art 4(1)(d) of the UNFCCC.  Such a duty would be consistent with 
relevant interpretative factors mentioned in article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties 1969271: the context of the treaty and the treaty’s object and purpose.  Both 
factors could lend support to the interpretation suggested by the ordinary meaning of the 
words.  The UNFCCC was negotiated in the context of the work of the IPCC who had in 
their early reports acknowledged the potential seriousness of climate change and the 
likelihood of climate change being linked to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.272  
In that context, it would be consistent to include some sort of duty to promote keeping 
fossil fuels in the ground given that the combustion of fossil fuels is the major 
anthropogenic source of greenhouse gas emissions. However, the ordinary meaning of the 
words interpreted in light of the object and purpose of the Treaty, while important, is not 
the only factor to consider when ascertaining the meaning of the duty.  State practice, 
including New Zealand’s and every other developed country’s practice of supporting fossil 
fuel extraction, runs counter to the duty.  The preparatory materials of the UNFCCC have 
not been examined for this paper but Bodansky’s description of the negotiations 
  
267 Catherine Schwarz (ed) The Chambers Dictionary (Chambers Harrap Publishers, Edinburgh, 1993) at 
1372. 
268 At 375. 
269 At 1378. 
270 At 557. 
271 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980). 
272 Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Jorge E. Viñuales International Environmental Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2015) at 143. 
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surrounding the word “reservoirs” suggests that the parties did not consider whether fossil 
fuels reserves would be a reservoir for the purposes of the article 4 duties.273 However, 
state practice can change and given the ordinary meaning of the words of the duties, New 
Zealand would be able to argue that phasing out fossil fuels is justified by those duties, 
which would make it more difficult for an investor to argue that phasing out fossil fuel 
extraction is for a public purpose and therefore perhaps non-compensable at least in relation 
to the expropriation article of the TPPA. 
 
VII  Conclusion  
Climate change is a clear and existent threat to present and future generations, in New 
Zealand and all around the world.  Without intervention, climate change will 
perpetuate global inequality as the greatest harm is likely to be caused to those who 
have done the least to cause this crisis.274  One of the major drivers of climate change 
is the combustion of fossil fuels for energy.  The international community has agreed 
that warming should be limited to well below 2ºC above pre-industrial levels.  For 
this to occur (barring a technological break-through and mass uptake of carbon 
capture and storage technology), more than three quarters of known fossil fuel 
reserves must not be burned.  In the context of the vast majority of fossil fuel reserves 
needing to remain in the ground, New Zealand would be in a comparatively good 
position to keep its fossil fuels in the ground: apart from natural gas and a small 
amount of coal, New Zealand does not rely on the fossil fuels extracted within its 
territory and EEZ for energy.  Fossil fuel extraction is not a major part of New 
Zealand’s economy (though present government policy is to encourage growth in this 
industry). 
 
The international legal framework relating to climate change deals primarily with 
influencing demand for fossil fuels: states are responsible for the greenhouse gas 
emissions that occur within their territory but not for the fossil fuel extraction within 
their boundaries of control.  Fossil fuels are not specifically mentioned in the 
UNFCCC or the Paris Agreement.  However, the UNFCCC contains a duty on states 
to promote the sustainable management of greenhouse gas reservoirs and to promote 
the conservation and enhancement of those reservoirs and a duty on Annex I states 
  
273 Daniel Bodansky “The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary” 
(1993) 18 Yale Int’l L. 451 at 509. 
274 International Bar Association Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force Report Achieving 
Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption (International Bar Association, London, July 
2014) at 2. 
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to protect reservoirs.  It has been argued in this paper that fossil fuel reserves are 
covered by the definition of greenhouse gas reservoirs in the UNFCCC.  The duty on 
all states to promote the conservation and enhancement of reservoirs has been 
reiterated in the Paris Agreement with reference back to art 4(1)(d) of the UNFCCC.  
The responsibility of each state to act in accordance with this duty is governed by the 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibility”,275 which makes 
quantification of a particular state’s obligations difficult.  However, the duty on 
Annex I states is stronger (to protect reservoirs) and could amount to an obligation 
to keep its fossil fuels in the ground. New Zealand would be in a strong position to 
promote the conservation of fossil fuel reserves within its territory given its position 
as a developed country which is not overly dependent on fossil fuels from within its 
territory.  
 
In this context, it is arguable that New Zealand’s fossil fuel mining regime is in 
conflict with its duty under the UNFCCC to protect its greenhouse gas reservoirs.  
The purpose of the CMA is to promote the extraction of minerals (including fossil 
fuels) for the good of New Zealand.  The scheme of the Act supports this purpose, in 
particular in relation to petroleum.  The Act assumes that if found, minerals will be 
extracted and extracted until depletion.  The progression of licences supports this: if 
activities undertaken pursuant to a exploration permit indicate a discovery, then the 
permit holder is entitled to upgrade their permit to a mining permit for that discovery.   
 
Due to the scheme of the CMA supporting the exploration for and then extraction of 
all petroleum in particular, it would not be possible to halt or phase fossil fuel 
extraction without legislative intervention. Apart from the possible challenges to 
actions taken below legislative level to halt fossil fuel extraction, it is also appropriate 
that if rights are being removed from rights holders that this removal be considered 
by the legislature. 
 
If legislation was passed halting or phasing out fossil fuel extraction in New Zealand, 
there would likely be no recourse for New Zealand investors involved in some way 
in fossil fuel extraction in New Zealand.  The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
does contain a right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure but this has not 
been interpreted to give a broad right to protection of property. There is no common 
law right for compensation for removal of property by the state.   
  
275 UNFCCC, above n 1, art 3(1) and 4(1). 
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However, foreign investors in the fossil fuel extraction industry in New Zealand may, 
depending on their nationality, have a right to take the New Zealand state to 
arbitration for removal of their rights pursuant to the investment treaties that New 
Zealand has entered into.  The TPPA (though not yet in force) is the most well-known 
and controversial of New Zealand’s investment treaties and its provisions have been 
the focus of this paper.  It is likely that the permits issued under the CMA would be 
investments for the purposes of the TPPA.  It is possible that actions taken to phase 
out fossil fuel extraction could be found to be direct or indirect expropriation of those 
investments.  However, if the phasing out of fossil fuel extraction is done for a public 
purpose (which it presumably would be), then it would be open for New Zealand to 
argue that its actions should not be characterised as expropriation but as regulation 
for a legitimate public purpose, which Annex 9-B of the TPPA describes as not 
expropriatory.  That phasing out fossil fuel extraction is for a legitimate public 
purpose of protecting the environment is leant support by the duty under the 
UNFCCC for New Zealand to protect its fossil fuel reserves.  The fact that New 
Zealand has not previously acknowledged that duty does detract from the strength of 
the argument.  However if the goal set in the Paris Agreement of keeping global 
average temperature rise to well below 2ºC is to be met, then all states will have to 
dramatically alter their relationships with fossil fuels and acknowledgment on the 
part of the developed country that it is has a duty to protect its fossil fuel reserves 
would be a step in the right direction.  It is worth arguing that New Zealand has not 
expropriated by phasing out fossil fuel extraction because with a finding of 
expropriation comes a particular formula for calculating compensation: the full 
market value at the date of expropriation, not taking into account any decrease in 
value that may have occurred due to discussions of the possible expropriation. 
 
Whether New Zealand would be found to have breached to minimum standard of 
treatment required by customary international law will in part depend on how New 
Zealand would choose to go about phasing out fossil fuels.  Following a proper 
process, including consultation with affected investors, would go some way to 
lessening the likelihood of a breach of this protection.  However, given how clear the 
expectations of investors will have been that New Zealand will have breached (that 
they will be able to rely on the permits until they expire), it is a real possibility that 
an arbitrator would find that there had been a breach of this section.  Article 9.6 does 
not prescribe a method of calculating compensation for a breach of this standard 
which would leave it open to New Zealand to argue that compensation should be less 
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than the full market value, perhaps because of the harm caused by combusting fossil 
fuels. 
 
If New Zealand chose to phase out fossil fuel extraction, it would not be defenceless 
to a claim made against it by a foreign investor for breach of New Zealand’s 
international investment treaty obligations.  However, even if New Zealand would 
have to compensate foreign investors for removing their rights to extract fossil fuels 
in New Zealand, New Zealand should not be dissuaded from acting on that basis.  In 
order to achieve the Paris Agreement’s goal, all contributions will be needed and 
New Zealand is comparatively well placed to bear the costs of phasing out fossil fuel 
extraction within its territory and EEZ. 
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